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For the second year in a row, Ohio experienced a decrease in 
new foreclosure filings in 2011. In 2009, Ohio saw more than 
89,000 foreclosure filings, more than in any prior year. Since 
then the rate has declined slightly to 85,483 in 2010 and 71,556 
in 2011. This welcome decrease still has Ohio foreclosures at 
levels that would have been unthinkable in the period prior to 
1990. What began as mostly an urban problem in the mid-
1990s erupted into a statewide epidemic. Despite recent 
declines, last year’s rates were still two times higher than they 
had been a decade before in every Ohio county.  
 
The high level of foreclosures represents a major and ongoing 
blow against families’ main source of savings and against 
stability. This report analyzes the new foreclosure filings 
statistics in Ohio along with some of the latest developments in 
foreclosure prevention efforts. To add context to the foreclosure numbers, the report provides updates 
on mortgage defaults and negative equity. It ends with recommendations to better assist individuals, 
families and communities in becoming more stable. 
 
Data analysis 
Ohio foreclosure filings declined last year by 16 percent. In 2011, there were 71,556 new foreclosure 
filings compared to 85,483 filings in 2010.1 This decrease in new foreclosure filings comes at a time 
when more federal and state resources than ever were put toward mortgage modifications. The 
number of foreclosures in the state remains at crisis levels, higher than in 11 of the last 16 years (see 
Figure 1). Since 1995, the number of filings has at least quadrupled in 81 of Ohio’s 88 counties and 
has more than quintupled statewide. However, last year foreclosure filings fell at least slightly in all 
but two of Ohio’s counties. There was one foreclosure filing for every 71 housing units in the state in 
2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 See note on the data at the end of the report.  
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For the sixth year in a row Cuyahoga County topped the list of foreclosures per 1,000 people (9.02). 
Coshocton (8.59) and Preble (7.81) followed. Brown (6.56) and Noble (3.28) fell out of the top five 
to number 13 and 75 while Hamilton (7.27) rose from 15th to the sixth highest ranking. More than 
half of the most troubled counties, six, were also on the list of counties with the highest rates in 2010. 
 
The number of foreclosure filings is high in urban, rural and suburban counties alike. (see Table 1) 
Among the top ten counties in filings per person in 2011 were five large urban counties, while in 
2007 large urban counties held nine of the ten spots for highest foreclosure filing levels.  
  
Figure 1 
Ohio foreclosure filings, 1995 to 2011 
 
Source: Ohio Supreme Court, Policy Matters Ohio review of filings in U.S. district courts. Data include federal filings 
beginning in 2004 and ending in 2008.  
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The largest decreases occurred in Lorain (27 percent), Mahoning (24 percent), and Lucas (23 percent) 
counties. Three large counties, Stark (5.66), Lorain (5.78), and Mahoning (5.78) – had lower 
foreclosure rates per 1,000 people than the state average (6.2). As in the past, Cuyahoga County had 
the highest number of filings with 11,544 in 2011. Table 2 shows foreclosure filings in Ohio’s ten 
largest counties in 2000 and 2011. 
 
Table 2 
Foreclosure filings per 1,000 population, largest Ohio counties, 2011 
  
2010 
Population 
2000 
filings 
2011 
filings 
% change in 
filings, 2000-2011 
% change in 
filings, 2010-2011 
Filings per 1,000 
population 
Cuyahoga 1,280,122 5,900 11,544 96 -10 9.02 
Franklin 1,163,414 3,832 7,834 104 -19 6.73 
Hamilton 802,374 2,770 5,834 111 -11 7.27 
Summit 541,781 1,851 3,658 98 -15 6.75 
Montgomery 535,153 2,457 3,924 60 -16 7.33 
Lucas 441,815 1,883 3,237 72 -24 7.33 
Stark 375,586 1,247 2,124 70 -17 5.66 
Butler 368,130 1,193 2,544 113 -20 6.91 
Lorain 301,356 938 1,742 86 -27 5.78 
Mahoning 238,823 925 1,381 49 -24 5.78 
Totals 6,048,554 22,996 43,822 91 -18 7.25 
Source: Ohio Supreme Court, U.S. Census Bureau. The population data is based on 2010 population because 2011 population 
data was not yet available as of the date of this report. 
Table 1 
Foreclosure per 1,000 population top 10 counties, 2011 
Counties 2010 population 2011 filings Filings per 1,000 population 
Cuyahoga 1,275,709 11,544 9.02 
Coshocton 36,901 317 8.59 
Preble 42,270 330 7.81 
Montgomery 535,153 3,924 7.33 
Lucas 441,815 3,237 7.33 
Hamilton 802,374 5,834 7.27 
Lake 230,041 1,609 6.99 
Ashtabula 101,497 708 6.98 
Butler 368,130 2,544 6.91 
Knox 60,921 421 6.91 
Source: Ohio Supreme Court, U.S. Census Bureau. The population data is based on 2010 population 
because 2011 population data was not yet available as of the date of this report. 
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Figure 2 shows that foreclosure filings varied from month to month in 2011, with a state average of 
5,963 filings per month. Filings generally spike in March, but in 2011 they peaked in August.  
 
Figure 2 
Foreclosure filings per month, 2011 
 
Source: Ohio Supreme Court 
 
Several factors related to the current mortgage market and foreclosure process help to explain the 
decrease in foreclosure filings. First, many of the urban counties where foreclosures grew for more 
than 10 years have fewer homeowners to foreclose on. This is increasingly evident by the thousands 
of vacant and abandoned properties in the inner core of Ohio’s cities. Second, many homeowners are 
working with housing counseling agencies and court mediation programs that dramatically improve 
their chances of saving their homes. In the last two years, groups put substantial effort into 
preempting the foreclosure filing process by providing outreach and education before foreclosure.  
 
Two other explanations relate to mortgage servicers. Some of the largest mortgage servicers faced 
uncertainty for much of 2011, pending the outcome of what ended up being a $25 billion foreclosure 
settlement. Servicers involved in this lawsuit included Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of 
America – all with delinquent properties in Ohio.2 This major lawsuit caused servicers to reexamine 
thousands of documents and dramatically slowed the foreclosure filing process. Finally, the sheer 
volume of the delinquent and foreclosed property inventory has overwhelmed mortgage servicers. 
Housing groups report that families have gone months or even over a year without a foreclosure filed 
against them despite major delinquency and repeated attempts to get a new loan.3 These factors all 
                                                
2 Full details of this historic settlement are available: http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/.  
3 Les Christie. “Foreclosure Free Ride,” CNN Money (January 1, 2012): 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/28/real_estate/foreclosure/index.htm.  
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influence the number of new foreclosure filings and as we discuss below, may mask the seriousness 
of the situation in Ohio. 
 
Additional mortgage trends 
Many indicators related to housing foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies remain grim. Ohio’s 
national ranking in new foreclosures has fallen somewhat over the last four years, but the state 
remains among the most troubled according to the latest survey by the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, conducted in the fourth quarter of 2011.4 The survey found that 8.42 percent of all Ohio 
mortgages are either actively in foreclosure or past due in their payments by at least 90 days, nearly 
unchanged from one year ago. The survey also found that new foreclosure proceedings were started 
on 1.08 percent of home loans during the quarter, ranking Ohio eleventh in the nation. That 
percentage was down from 1.32 percent in the same quarter a year earlier. The survey indicates that 
other states, particularly in the Sunbelt and North Central region, now have new foreclosure rates 
higher than those here. However, it also shows that the share of loans in Ohio that are past due remain 
high. Without intervention this will lead to increased foreclosures.  
 
First American CoreLogic recently issued its yearly report of highly delinquent and troubled 
mortgages, noting that Ohio remained unchanged from last year with seven percent of mortgages in 
serious delinquency.5 What’s more, the average number of days in serious delinquency and of being 
in foreclosure has increased in the last several years. The mortgage servicing industry cannot keep up 
with the new filings and late payments. According to the December 2011 "LPS Mortgage Monitor" 
from the Lender Processing Services, the average foreclosure takes 674 days (nearly two years) to 
complete, double the time frame of 253 days from 2007.6 A recent Wall Street Journal article 
reviewed loan servicing in all 50 states, finding a strong link between larger loan balances and longer 
foreclosure processes.7     
 
Data on home equity in Ohio is also troubling. According to the fourth quarter 2011 report by First 
American CoreLogic, Ohio ranks fourth in total number of home mortgages with negative or near-
negative equity, up two notches from 2010 (see Figure 3).  
  
                                                
4 Mortgage Bankers Association, “National Delinquency Survey, Third Quarter 2010,” (September 2010). 
5 First American CoreLogic “National Foreclosure Report” (March 15, 2012):  http://www.corelogic.com/about-
us/researchtrends/asset_upload_file902_14571.pdf  
6 Lender Processing Services, “LPS Mortgage Monitor: December 2011 Mortgage Performance Monitor.” 
http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporateInformation/CommunicationCenter/PressResources/Pages/MortgageMonitor.aspx 
7 Shelly Banjo and Nick Timiraos. “For Costliest Homes, Foreclosures Comes Slowly,” Wall Street Journal (February 28, 
2012) 
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Figure 3 
Negative equity in the states 
 
Source: Core Logic, Negative Equity Q4 2011 
 
More than 520,000 Ohio mortgages are “under water,” with debt exceeding current value. This is an 
increase of 80,000 mortgages from the fourth quarter in 2010. Ohio homeowners have $16 billion in 
negative equity for an average of more than $30,000 per each underwater mortgage.8 Ohio’s average 
negative equity amount is considerably lower than other states because of lower home prices and 
consequently, smaller loans. In percentage terms, more than 30 percent of home mortgages in Ohio 
have negative or near-negative equity, ranking Ohio eighth in the country in this category (see Figure 
4).9 The loan-to-value ratio in Ohio is more than 76 percent, meaning that Ohio mortgage holders, in 
                                                
8 Ted Gayer. “Negative Equity Concentrated in a Few States,” Brookings Institution (March 2, 2012): 
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0302_negative_equity_gayer.aspx. 
9 Near-negative equity refers to mortgages with five percent or less equity in their homes, which are unlikely to recover 
value given falling home values.  
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total, have less than 25 percent ownership in their home mortgages (see Figure 5). Ohio ranks sixth in 
the category.10  
 
Figure 4 
Negative and near-negative equity share of mortgage in the states 
 
Source: Core Logic, Negative Equity Q4 2011 
 
  
                                                
10 These statistics do not take into account homes with no mortgages. 
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Figure 5 
Loan-to-value ratio 
 
Source: Core Logic, Negative Equity Q4 2011 
 
Negative equity poses enormous problems for homeowners because they cannot refinance or sell 
their homes unless they take a financial loss. According to CoreLogic’s three years of trend analysis, 
properties with negative equity are far more likely to be foreclosed on than homes with more than 
five percent equity. It is also problematic for communities as it erodes the tax base, leads to vacant 
properties, and increases the costs of public services for communities. As housing values continue to 
decline in Ohio, it is unlikely that many of these 600,000 home mortgages will regain positive equity 
without public intervention. Still, most borrowers continue to pay on their mortgages, indicating that 
well-planned intervention can keep families in their homes. 
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The federal HAMP efforts 
The largest federal program to curb foreclosures, the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP),11 attempts to help homeowners through a modification process by adjusting the interest 
rate, lowering monthly payments, and creating a new payment plan. Few homeowners make it from 
trial modification (the first three months of the program) to the final modification stage. According to 
the most recent HAMP report through April 2011, only 13,626 Ohioans secured a permanent 
modification to their mortgage. The report lists 3,080 homeowners in active trials. After more than 
three years of this program, that represents a fraction of the new foreclosure filings and delinquent 
borrowers in Ohio. Additionally, only 2.2 percent of new trial modifications under HAMP are in 
Ohio. This program is insufficient; innovative state and local policies are needed. 
 
Ohio’s efforts to push modifications have increased in the last several years, but the state continues to 
do too little. Increased notification of resources for assistance, the establishment of a toll-free state 
hotline, mediation efforts backed by the Ohio Supreme Court and non-binding compacts with 
servicers for loan modifications are of modest help, but neglect the root of the foreclosure crisis in 
Ohio. State laws lack the enforcement provisions to mandate that loan servicers participate in 
mediation or reduce the principal balance of mortgages. The new federal and state effort, the Hardest 
Hit Foreclosure Initiative, provided millions of dollars targeting unemployed and distressed 
homeowners.12 Early results, assisting 4,000 families, are promising, but three issues continue to 
hamper the effort.13 First, servicers may not need to comply with federal workout regulations because 
many are not federally-regulated lenders. Second, funding for housing programs is on the decline, 
making it harder to help homeowners through community-funded programs. Third, divisions remain 
between servicers, lenders, and federal agencies that have different goals and rules for modifications. 
These divisions make it hard for a homeowner to receive a loan modification.14 
 
  
                                                
11 Making Home Affordable Program “Service Performance Report Through April 2011,”: 
http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/.  
12 http://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-issues/hardest-hit-foreclosure-initiative 
13 See Ohio Housing Finance Agency, “Winter 2012 Newsletter”: http://www.ohiohome.org/2012WinterNL.pdf 
14 Diane E. Thompson. “Foreclosure Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications,” 
Washington Law Review Association (Volume 86, 2011): http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspace-
law/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1074/86WLR755.pdf.  
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Policy recommendations 
Housing foreclosures have decimated every Ohio county, and both delinquencies and foreclosures 
will remain at crisis levels. A mix of federal and state policy changes would help to slow housing 
foreclosures.  
 
Federal: Don’t let Hardest Hit program expire 
We recommend that the federal government continue to provide funding for the Hardest Hit funds 
program for Ohio rather than as a one-time effort, set to expire in 2013. Additionally, it is imperative 
that servicers conduct principal reductions to reflect the true value of homes; otherwise, programs 
will continue to fall short.  
 
The federal government has used several methods to disburse funding to homeowners. The first part 
of the HAMP relief effort was slated to help owners by offering monetary incentives for servicers 
who complete workouts and loan modifications or refinancing for properties worth less than 
mortgages. As shown by the numbers from the HAMP 2011 report (above), this has not worked well 
in Ohio. The program remains voluntary for lenders and servicers, wrought with technical loopholes 
and exclusions, and not adequate to reach the number of Ohioans who need help. Homeowners 
complain that this process is lengthy and that servicers continuously change staff, lose paperwork, 
and do not offer lower payments in the long-run.15  
 
Federal efforts are weak because they too often can’t reduce the principal of the mortgage. Instead 
these programs change the interest rate, create forbearance (a short-term agreement that temporarily 
changes the interest rate or allows partial payments), or extend the term of the loan. Given the 
negative equity of nearly one in three Ohio mortgages, these efforts will continue to fall short. 
However, these federal programs exemplify that there are resources available for states, but there 
must be flexibility in tailoring funds and programs for specific state needs. What works in states with 
higher home values is not working in Midwest states like Ohio.  
 
Federal: Extend the Mortgage Debt Relief Act  
The Mortgage Debt Relief Act is slated to expire at the end of 2012. This little known tax credit is 
critical for homeowners who receive a modified mortgage or short sale on their property.16 Without 
this law, they would be required to pay taxes on the settled debt or “income” from the transaction 
even though they did not receive any actual income from the transaction. If homeowners are 
penalized for adjusting their mortgages or working with a lender to achieve a short sale, this will 
further stall the foreclosure process.17 Congress extended the law with bipartisan support in 2007, and 
should do so again. 
 
The aftermath foreclosure is often vacancy and abandonment (see more below). In 2010, U.S. 
Senator Sherrod Brown commissioned the Government Accountability Office to study the scope and 
                                                
15 Anna Cuevas. “Houston, We have a Problem with HAMP Loan Modifications“ Huffington Post (January 6, 2011) : 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anna-cuevas/hope-for-homeowners-houst_b_801825.html 
16 A short-sale refers to a lender accepting less than the loan balance on a property.  
17 Glen Fest. “Unforgiven,” American Banker (March 1, 2012): http://www.americanbanker.com/magazine/122_3/will-
the-mortgage-forgiveness-debt-relief-act-be-extended-1046848-1.html?zkPrintable=true.  
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depth of the bank walkaway problem.18 The study found a disproportionate number of bank 
walkaways in Ohio, Michigan, and Florida compared to other states. The report said: 
“Although abandoned foreclosures occur infrequently, the areas in which they were 
concentrated are significantly affected. Vacant homes associated with abandoned foreclosures 
can contribute to increased crime and decreased neighborhood property values. Abandoned 
foreclosures also increase costs for local governments that must maintain or demolish vacant 
properties. Because servicers are not required to notify borrowers and communities when they 
decide to abandon a foreclosure, homeowners are sometimes unaware that they still own the 
home and are responsible for paying the debt and taxes and maintaining the property.”  
In 2011, the Center on Urban Poverty and Social Change released a report specific to northeast Ohio 
identifying bank walkaways as more likely to be vacant, tax delinquent, and demolished.19 
Specifically, 56 percent of the 999 stalled foreclosure cases could be considered bank walkaways 
where the property did not make it to sale. These two reports indicate that bank walkaways are a 
serious issue in Ohio. 
Federal: Pass bill to fund demolition of vacant properties 
Closely tied to the problems of bank walkaways are vacant and abandoned properties. A recent 
estimate of vacant properties topped 100,000 in Ohio.20 Most of these properties, the end result of 
foreclosures, are not sellable or suitable for rehab. Rather, the most efficient route is to demolish 
them at an estimated $8,000 to $10,000 per property. Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine recently 
announced that the state would use $97 million from the 2011 mortgage settlement to demolish 
vacant and abandoned homes.21 This is an important effort that needs more capital and attention.  
That’s why it’s important that Congress pass the bipartisan bill introduced by Ohio Representatives 
Steven LaTourette and Marcia Fudge to raise $4 billion in bonds for demolishing vacant and 
abandoned properties.22 
 
 
State: Regulate loan servicers 
When Ohio codified Senate Bill 185 several years ago, legislators regulated the front end of the 
mortgage lending process and helped prevent predatory mortgage lending. Yet there are few rules for 
lenders and servicers as the mortgage process continues after origination. Many servicers of loans are 
not federally regulated and few banks service their own loans at the local level. There continue to be 
too few incentives for servicers to modify mortgages when they generate fees from late payments, 
                                                
18 Government Accountability Office. “Mortgage Foreclosures: Additional Mortgage Servicer Actions Could Reduce the 
Frequency and Impact of Abandoned Foreclosures.” GAO-11-93 (November 15, 2010): 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-93.  
19 Michael Schramm et al. “Stalling the Foreclosure Process: The Complexity Behind Bank Walkaways,” Center on 
Urban Poverty and Social Change, Mandel School of Applied Social Sciences (February 7, 2011). 
20 Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine. “Foreclosure Settlement Quick Facts for Local Governments and Community 
Organizations,” at http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/speakoutohio/foreclosure.  
21 10TV News. “Mortgage Settlement Could Clean Up Neighborhoods,” (February 9, 2012): 
http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2012/02/09/columbus-mortgage-settlement-could-clean-up-neighborhoods.html 
22 Jay Miller. “Reps. Fudge, LaTourette to push bill to provide $4B for razing vacant properties,” Crain’s Cleveland 
Business (March 19, 2012): http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20120319/FREE/120319833#. 
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appraisals, and other actions. There is also no mandate that servicers work with borrowers. Servicer 
regulation would help prevent the “robo-signing” fiasco from 2010 and would ensure baseline 
protections such as making sure the lender has the proper authority to file for foreclosure.  
 
At a minimum, we should require servicers to provide updated information to borrowers about their 
loan and how to prevent foreclosure. The disconnect between the servicer, mortgagee, and 
homeowner is a substantial impediment to resolving a foreclosure. The increased fees could help 
provide housing counseling (see below), address vacant and abandoned properties, and deal with 
other negative effects of foreclosures.  
 
Revenue for these purposes could also be provided by closing loopholes in Ohio taxes on financial 
institutions, as proposed by the Kasich Administration. Instead of using those funds to cut bank tax 
rates, as Kasich proposes, we could dedicate them toward solving these housing problems.23  
 
State: Increase funds for counseling 
One of the most successful efforts to curtail foreclosures has been having HUD-certified housing 
counselors assist borrowers in mortgage workouts, short-sales, or other housing options. Housing 
counselors offer help to bridge the disconnects and divisions in the mortgage modification and 
foreclosure process. Counselors effectively serve as guides, walking a homeowner through the 
foreclosure process. Funding for these efforts has already been decreased and faces more uncertainty. 
The HUD counseling group Empowering and Strengthening Ohio’s People (ESOP), one of the state’s 
largest and most successful programs for helping homeowners, estimates a cost of $200 to $300 per 
homeowner.24  
 
Given the success rate of counseling and the complications of the foreclosure process to borrowers, 
we recommend that funding for counseling of troubled borrowers be increased.  
 
Mediation efforts for homeowners are improving, but final outcomes remain mixed. Many courts in 
Ohio already refer foreclosure cases to mediation services. Mediation is often voluntary for the lender 
and homeowner, the lender has little flexibility, the process occurs late in the foreclosure process, and 
most mediations end without a new loan agreement.25 More recent results indicate that many 
homeowners received a resolution to their foreclosure, but it is unclear if they stayed in their home or 
averted foreclosure in the long-run.26 A report by the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling 
(NFMC) program found that homeowners with a counselor were 60 percent more likely to avoid 
foreclosure compared to those without a counselor.27 The same study found that counseled borrowers 
received favorable modifications, reducing their payments by at least $450 per month.  
 
                                                
23 Joseph Testa, Tax Commissioner, Testimony on Tax Provisions of House Bill 487, House Ways & Means Committee, 
March 21, 2012 
24 See testimony of Mark Seifert to the Senate Finance and Financial Institutions Committee on SB 197 (February 9, 
2010). 
25 National Consumer Law Center “State and local mediation programs: Can they save homes?” (September 2009): 
http://www.consumerlaw.org/issues/foreclosure_mediation/content/ReportS-Sept09.pdf.  
26 Elizabeth Gibson. “Foreclosure Mediation Can Help,” Columbus Dispatch (May 15, 2011): 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/05/15/foreclosure-mediation-can-help.html 
27 Neil Mayer et al. “National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program Evaluation” Urban Institute (November 2, 
2009): http://www.urban.org/publications/411982.html.  
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For mediation to work, there must be adequate numbers of counselors. 28 Given the very strong record 
that counseling has brought about, we recommend an expansion of federal and state resources for 
counseling, with program design consistent with that recommended in the NCLC study.  
 
State: Enact a stronger tenant-protection law 
The federal Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act of 2009 (extended by the Dodd-Frank Act) 
attempted to address the concerns of eviction and notification for tenants but it lacks the strong 
notification, enforcement, and longevity of a state law (it currently sunsets in 2014).29 Policy Matters 
reported earlier on the problem of renters being evicted or not notified when their rental housing was 
going through foreclosure.30 The Policy Matters study found that rental properties accounted for 
nearly 30 percent of residential foreclosure filings in Cuyahoga County in 2007, and that foreclosures 
on rental properties increased 29 percent in the county from 2006. Our data analysis for 2010 reveals 
nearly identical numbers for rental property foreclosures. The study found costs of more than $2,500 
for displaced tenants, two-thirds of whom were forced to leave their homes and live with family 
members and friends despite being current on rent and in good tenancy. Tenants must use the 
provisions of the federal law in the court system during their eviction defense, and it is not well 
understood by clients or the judicial system.31 Tenants deserve adequate notice and protections when 
a foreclosure occurs on their rental unit. This is why we recommend that Ohio enact a tenant 
protection law with better provisions for notification and enforcement.  
 
State: Forbid bank walkaways 
An increasing number of foreclosure filings are initiated by the loan servicer but never result in a 
transfer of property after a court judgment and sheriff’s sale. The term “bank walkaway” is 
commonly used to describe situations where the plaintiff gets a judgment from the court but fails to 
execute on the judgment, leaving the property unmarketable and with no owner. The former 
homeowner is often under the assumption that the home title has transferred to the lender or sold at 
auction, only to find later that they are still listed as the legal owner of record. This situation, often 
called a “toxic title” or “zombie loan,” frustrates local communities because the properties sit vacant 
and abandoned, largely unable to be sold or rehabilitated.32  
Ohio should enact a provision that requires a timetable after foreclosure judgment to take the property 
to sheriff sale, work out a new deal with the borrower, or remove the judgment lien from the record 
of title, which would mean the property could be sold and the homeowner’s credit cleared.  
  
                                                
28 See testimony of Margaret E. Monroe Miller, JD to the Senate Finance and Financial institutions Committee on SB 197 
(February 9, 2010).  
29 http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/speakoutohio/foreclosure/tenants-rights-regarding-foreclosure  
30 David Rothstein. “Collateral Damage: Renters in the Foreclosure Crisis.” Policy Matters Ohio (June, 2008). 
http://www.policymattersohio.org/CollateralDamage2008.htm.   
31 Mary Kane “Renters lost in shuffle in anti-foreclosure effort,” Washington Independent (November 20, 2009): 
http://washingtonindependent.com/68464/renters-lost-in-the-shuffle-in-anti-foreclosure-efforts.  
32 There has been substantial media attention to the subject of bank walkaways. See, for instance, Susan Saulny “Banks 
starting to walk away on foreclosures” New York Times (March 30, 2009); Sandra Livingston “Bank ‘walkaways’ from 
foreclosed homes are a growing, troubling trend,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 19, 2009): 
http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2009/07/bank_walkaways_from_foreclosed.html; Ken McCall “Drop in foreclosure 
called ‘very scary,’” Dayton Daily News (October 17, 2009): http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/dayton-news/drop-
in-foreclosures-called-very-scary-352689.html.   
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State: Forbid foreclosure rescue scams 
Sincere efforts by counselors, mediators, and lenders to help homeowners are being abused by groups 
that prey on troubled borrowers with false claims of securing new mortgages, reducing payments, or 
eliminating financial debt. Most fraudulent companies charge an up-front or monthly fee for their 
services with little return or contact after payment. The fees can range from $500 to $3,000, and in 
some cases the borrower can sign over the title to their home. The other harmful practice is that the 
companies often tell borrowers not to work with their servicer, lender, or any other counseling 
agencies during the process.33 The Ohio Attorney General and federal agencies are pursuing some of 
these individuals and groups, but there is currently no state law that carries the proper provisions and 
enforcement mechanisms to deal with this predatory lending practice.34 Given the number of troubled 
homeowners, Ohio should pass a strong state law forbidding this practice and banning up-front fees.   
 
As foreclosures continue to devastate communities and homeowners, the Ohio legislature should pass 
reforms to encourage real loan modifications, protect tenants, and reduce the foreclosure filing rate.  
 
There is no panacea for this crisis but the current state and federal structures for mitigating 
foreclosure are wrought with loopholes, exemptions, and dead ends that make it nearly impossible to 
fend off foreclosure. Even with increased federal and state attention to the issue, foreclosures 
continue to cripple communities and are not tied solely to subprime or alternative home loans. As a 
whole, the Mortgage Banker Association numbers show that almost one in six Ohio homeowners 
with mortgages were delinquent or already in foreclosure as of the fourth quarter of 2011. Since 
1995, the average Ohio county saw more than a 350 percent increase in foreclosure filings, with most 
of the urban counties at higher percentages. Rural and suburban counties are not immune to 
foreclosure as they have seen the largest growth in the recent years. No area remains unaffected by 
housing foreclosures. Ohio cannot afford to wait for federal plans to funnel downward. More federal 
and state action is urgently needed. 
  
                                                
33 National Consumer Law Center “Desperate Homeowners: Loan Mod Scammers Step in When Loan Servicers Refuse 
to Provide Relief,” July 2009. 
34 Sheryl Harris “Ohio Attorney General shuts down foreclosure rescue scam, “Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 4, 2009): 
http://www.cleveland.com/consumeraffairs/index.ssf/2009/05/ohio_attorney_general_shuts_do_2.html.   
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A note on the data 
There is no perfect measure of foreclosures; the filing data in this report capture the process at one 
stage, but do not exactly measure the number of families that lose their homes to foreclosure. This 
report uses data from the Ohio Supreme Court and information compiled by Policy Matters Ohio 
from the two federal district courts in Ohio. The Supreme Court data are filed by county common 
pleas courts. They are consistent from year to year, allowing a comparison over time and between 
Ohio's counties. As described below, while previous years’ data include federal filings, there are none 
included after 2008.  
 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reporting of foreclosure filings includes an unspecified number of non-
mortgage foreclosure cases, including delinquent tax foreclosures and others. It also includes double 
filings that occur if bankruptcy interrupts the process, or if a lender uses the threat of foreclosure as a 
collection mechanism several times against one borrower. Nonmortgage filings and double filings 
have not been eliminated from the data. All foreclosure data in this report are for filings. Not all 
filings lead to actual foreclosures, in which borrowers lose title to their property. On the other hand, 
filing statistics do not cover all cases in which homeowners lose their property, such as cases in 
which they give the title back to the lender and walk away from the home. 
 
Policy Matters began compiling federal filings made as of 2004; such cases were not filed in as large 
numbers prior to that point. After growing significantly, in late 2007, the flow of such cases slowed 
to a trickle, and the number has not picked up again since. The small remainder included commercial 
disputes such as alleged non-payment to contractors, filings by the U.S. government for payment in 
cases of deceased homeowners and a handful of cases by borrowers claiming mistreatment, but 
virtually no standard filings involving residential properties. Thus, we do not have any federal filings 
in this report after 2008. As noted in our 2008 report, there is some duplication between state and 
federal court cases. 
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Table 3 
New foreclosure filings by Ohio county, 1995 and 2008-2011 
County 
1995 
filings 2008 filings 2009 filings 
2010 
filings 
2011 
filings 
Change 
2010-2011 
Change 
1995-2011 
Rank in 
growth, 
1995-2011 
Adams 25 155 163 130 95 -27% 280% 73 
Allen 164 996 690 682 472 -31% 188% 81 
Ashland 30 282 348 319 249 -22% 730% 16 
Ashtabula 111 782 802 759 708 -7% 538% 27 
Athens 21 169 192 161 147 -9% 600% 21 
Auglaize 34 227 262 248 216 -13% 535% 28 
Belmont 40 220 228 265 205 -23% 413% 48 
Brown 62 371 385 407 294 -28% 374% 53 
Butler 447 2,987 3,162 3,166 2,544 -20% 469% 38 
Carroll 35 122 168 170 132 -22 % 277% 74 
Champaign 45 256 318 293 224 -24% 398% 50 
Clark 144 1,124 1,104 1,067 881 -17% 512% 31 
Clermont 182 1,285 1,342 1,402 1,153 -18% 534% 29 
Clinton 36 291 397 330 264 -20% 633% 19 
Columbiana 258 636 702 681 534 -22% 107% 87 
Coshocton 19 180 187 163 317 95% 1568% 1 
Crawford 31 337 312 304 262 -14% 745% 13 
Cuyahoga 3,345 13,858 14,171 12,825 11,544 -10% 245% 76 
Darke 45 310 311 273 198 -28% 340% 59 
Defiance 22 183 198 225 191 -15% 768% 12 
Delaware 130 909 1,003 989 886 -10% 582% 23 
Erie 75 562 539 548 444 -19% 492% 35 
Fairfield 110 964 1,019 963 795 -17% 623% 20 
Fayette 16 216 235 201 181 -10% 1031% 4 
Franklin 1,459 9,305 9,499 9,649 7,834 -19% 437% 45 
Fulton 17 216 273 251 222 -12% 1206% 3 
Gallia 42 95 82 113 100 -12% 138% 85 
Geauga 81 435 508 497 463 -7% 472% 37 
Greene 242 773 851 817 765 -6 % 216% 79 
Guernsey 50 210 221 188 198 5% 296% 70 
Hamilton 1,490 6,673 6,714 6,556 5,834 -11% 292% 71 
Hancock 84 436 534 503 336 -33% 300% 69 
Hardin 39 210 185 173 172 -0.6% 341% 58 
Harrison 11 81 70 81 56 -31% 409% 49 
Henry 7 146 183 162 111 -32% 1486% 2 
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Highland 31 351 381 307 262 -15% 745% 14 
Hocking 37 178 166 201 152 -24% 311% 66 
Holmes 15 109 103 117 105 -10% 600% 22 
Huron 30 396 423 382 303 -21% 910% 8 
Jackson 63 198 220 207 157 -24% 149% 84 
Jefferson 57 297 308 338 280 -17% 391% 51 
Knox 195 405 453 502 421 -16% 116% 86 
Lake 301 1,517 1,695 1760 1,609 -9% 435% 46 
Lawrence 42 260 260 252 216 -14% 414% 47 
Licking 89 1,204 1,178 1,188 983 -17% 1005% 7 
Logan 69 323 340 328 278 -15% 303% 68 
Lorain 413 2,442 2,696 2,385 1,742 -27% 322% 63 
Lucas 1,165 4,359 4,491 4,232 3,237 -24% 178% 82 
Madison 96 198 273 201 146 -27% 52% 88 
Mahoning 321 1,836 1,755 1,819 1,381 -24% 330% 62 
Marion 92 531 584 541 388 -28% 322% 64 
Medina 140 961 1,155 1,098 906 -18% 547% 25 
Meigs 13 75 74 71 60 -16% 362% 55 
Mercer 21 142 154 161 117 -27% 457% 41 
Miami 81 590 741 676 543 -20% 570% 24 
Monroe 12 38 33 32 31 -3% 158% 83 
Montgomery 949 5,194 4,703 4,673 3,924 -16% 314% 65 
Morgan 8 37 85 64 48 -25% 500% 33 
Morrow 54 261 242 291 207 -29% 283% 72 
Muskingum 78 563 450 530 425 -20% 445% 43 
Noble 5 38 32 126 48 -62% 860% 9 
Ottawa 42 273 262 272 183 -33% 336% 60 
Paulding 24 126 151 113 77 -32% 221 % 78 
Perry 26 217 234 217 214 -1% 723% 17 
Pickaway 29 318 339 297 272 -8% 838% 10 
Pike 31 129 104 121 94 -22% 203% 80 
Portage 143 874 935 991 792 -20% 454% 42 
Preble 96 374 370 384 330 -14% 244% 77 
Putnam 16 104 100 109 86 -21% 438% 44 
Richland 128 862 903 798 717 -10% 460% 39 
Ross 74 416 518 424 349 -18% 372% 54 
Sandusky 42 321 408 325 268 -18% 538% 26 
Scioto 63 304 324 325 273 -16% 333% 61 
Seneca 79 316 331 355 296 -17% 275% 75 
Shelby 44 250 303 291 274 -6% 523% 30 
Stark 380 3,017 2,700 2,549 2,124 -17% 459% 40 
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Summit 745 4,113 4,633 4320 3,658 -15% 391% 52 
Trumbull 254 1,481 1,605 1,413 1,161 -18% 357% 57 
Tuscarawas 56 389 453 409 340 -17% 507% 32 
Union 26 320 338 340 291 -14% 1019% 5 
Van Wert 18 201 207 156 133 -15% 639% 18 
Vinton 10 43 65 56 41 -27% 310% 67 
Warren 112 1,306 1,498 1,450 1,242 -14% 1009% 6 
Washington 33 173 201 154 152 -1% 361% 56 
Wayne 41 462 588 493 356 -28% 768% 11 
Williams 17 199 273 230 143 -38% 741% 15 
Wood 106 582 750 727 610 -16% 476% 36 
Wyandot 14 98 107 121 84 -31% 500% 34 
Total 15,975 85,773 89,053 85,483 71,556 -16% 348% 
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Table 4 
Foreclosure filing rates in Ohio counties 2011 
Counties 2010 Population 2011 Filings 
2011 filings/ 
1,000 pop. Rate Rank 
Adams 28,550 95 3.33 74 
Allen 106,331 472 4.44 61 
Ashland 53,139 249 4.69 56 
Ashtabula 101,497 708 6.98 8 
Athens 64,757 147 2.27 87 
Auglaize 45,949 216 4.70 55 
Belmont 70,400 205 2.91 81 
Brown 44,846 294 6.56 13 
Butler 368,130 2,544 6.91 9 
Carroll 28,836 132 4.58 58 
Champaign 40,097 224 5.59 32 
Clark 138,333 881 6.37 14 
Clermont 197,363 1,153 5.84 23 
Clinton 42,040 264 6.28 15 
Columbiana 107,841 534 4.95 46 
Coshocton 36,901 317 8.59 2 
Crawford 43,784 262 5.98 19 
Cuyahoga 1,280,122 11,544 9.02 1 
Darke 52,959 198 3.74 68 
Defiance 39,037 191 4.89 50 
Delaware 174,214 886 5.09 43 
Erie 76963 444 5.77 29 
Fairfield 146,156 795 5.44 36 
Fayette 29,030 181 6.23 16 
Franklin 1,163,414 7,834 6.73 12 
Fulton 42,698 222 5.20 41 
Gallia 30,934 100 3.23 77 
Geauga 93,389 463 4.96 45 
Greene 161,573 765 4.73 53 
Guernsey 40,087 198 4.94 47 
Hamilton 802,374 5,834 7.27 6 
Hancock 74,782 336 4.49 59 
Hardin 32,058 172 5.37 37 
Harrison 15,864 56 3.53 70 
Henry 28,215 111 3.93 65 
Highland 43,589 262 6.01 18 
Hocking 29,380 152 5.17 42 
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Holmes 42,366 105 2.48 85 
Huron 59,626 303 5.08 44 
Jackson 33,225 157 4.73 54 
Jefferson 69,709 280 4.02 64 
Knox 60,921 421 6.91 10 
Lake 230,041 1,609 6.99 7 
Lawrence 62,450 216 3.46 71 
Licking 166,492 983 5.90 22 
Logan 45,858 278 6.06 17 
Lorain 301,356 1,742 5.78 28 
Lucas 441,815 3,237 7.33 5 
Madison 43,435 146 3.36 73 
Mahoning 238,823 1,381 5.78 27 
Marion 66,501 388 5.83 26 
Medina 172,332 906 5.26 39 
Meigs 23,770 60 2.52 83 
Mercer 40,814 117 2.87 82 
Miami 102,506 543 5.30 38 
Monroe 14,642 31 2.12 88 
Montgomery 535,153 3,924 7.33 4 
Morgan 15,054 48 3.19 78 
Morrow 34,827 207 5.94 20 
Muskingum 86,074 425 4.94 48 
Noble 14,645 48 3.28 75 
Ottawa 41,428 183 4.42 62 
Paulding 19,614 77 3.93 66 
Perry 36,058 214 5.93 21 
Pickaway 55,698 272 4.88 51 
Pike 28,709 94 3.27 76 
Portage 161,419 792 4.91 49 
Preble 42,270 330 7.81 3 
Putnam 34,499 86 2.49 84 
Richland 124,475 717 5.76 30 
Ross 78,064 349 4.47 60 
Sandusky 60,944 268 4.40 63 
Scioto 79,499 273 3.43 72 
Seneca 56,745 296 5.22 40 
Shelby 49,423 274 5.54 34 
Stark 375,586 2,124 5.66 31 
Summit 541,781 3,658 6.75 11 
Trumbull 210,312 1,161 5.52 35 
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Tuscarawas 92,582 340 3.67 69 
Union 52,300 291 5.56 33 
Van Wert 28,744 133 4.63 57 
Vinton 13,435 41 3.05 80 
Warren 212,693 1,242 5.84 24 
Washington 61,778 152 2.46 86 
Wayne 114,520 356 3.11 79 
Williams 37,642 143 3.80 67 
Wood 125,488 610 4.86 52 
Wyandot 22,615 84 5.84 25 
Ohio 11,536,388 71,556 6.20 
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